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Chapter 7 
Inspiration for children’s human rights from indigenous peoples’ rights 
Ellen Desmet 
 
1. Introduction 
Although there are many and obvious differences between children and indigenous peoples, 
there are also quite some similarities, especially in how international human rights law and 
academic research have addressed the claims of these groups. This chapter focuses on three 
domains in which children’s rights and indigenous peoples’ rights share certain challenges, in 
order to explore whether and how both branches of human rights law could inspire each other: 
(i) the demarcation of the personal scope of rights, and the divisions and dichotomies 
generated by the establishment of categorical human rights; (ii) the way in which indigenous 
peoples and children have been constructed, especially from a Western perspective, and the 
consequences thereof; and (iii) participation and consent. I will argue that children’s rights 
law could draw inspiration from indigenous peoples’ rights law in defining its rights holders, 
in developing the collective dimension of the right to be heard and in conceptualising the right 
of children to give consent. On the other hand, an area in which research and practice on both 
indigenous peoples’ rights and children’s rights should increase efforts, concerns addressing 
the adverse consequences of idealised constructions. 
This chapter has developed in an organic way, following the flow of my professional life. In 
my PhD research, I analysed the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities in the 
context of nature conservation initiatives, with ethnographic fieldwork in the Peruvian 
Amazon.i After that, I delved into children’s rights through my work at the Flemish 
Children’s Rights Knowledge Centre.ii Working on both indigenous peoples’ rights and 
children’s rights, I have at times been struck by parallels in how these two groups have been 
approached in law and research. The notes and reflections on those parallels gathered over the 
years formed the backbone of this chapter.  
 
2. The personal scope of indigenous peoples’ and children’s rights law 
a. The definitional tangle 
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A first challenge that is common to indigenous peoples’ rights law and children’s rights law 
concerns the demarcation of their personal scope. Who can invoke the protection of these 
categorical forms of rights protection? And who has the power to decide this?  
Definitions of ‘indigenous peoples’ in international law have evolved over time and differ in 
the elements they emphasise. The most influential definitions are those of Conventions No. 
107 and – especially – No. 169 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as well as the 
one provided by Martínez Cobo in his “Study on the Problem of Discrimination against 
Indigenous Populations”.iii No definition of indigenous peoples has been universally 
endorsed, however. Interestingly, the lack of a universally accepted definition has not 
prevented the global rise of the indigenous movement and the development of an extensive 
body of legislation, case law and doctrine concerning the rights of indigenous peoples. 
Indigenous peoples themselves emphasise that a definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ is “not 
necessary or desirable,” and stress the right of self-identification.iv Such a right of self-
identification has two components: the right of an individual to identify him- or herself as 
indigenous, and the right of a group to define its membership. Of these two components, the 
former, the right of an individual to choose to belong to a particular people or ‘to opt out’, 
takes precedence over the latter.v Any other approach would unduly encroach upon individual 
liberty – a cornerstone of human rights law. Various reasons underpin the importance attached 
by indigenous peoples to self-identification. First, given the enormous diversity in the 
historical and current situation of indigenous peoples throughout the globe, any definition 
risks being underinclusive in certain contexts or overinclusive in others. Moreover, attributing 
definitional power to an external actor, such as a state or international organisation, would 
imply that the latter would also have the possibility not to recognise indigenous peoples.vi 
History is a powerful witness of the adverse consequences entailed by such a denial of the 
existence of indigenous peoples and their rights. 
The Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which was established in 1982, followed this 
position of indigenous peoples, as it decided not to adopt a formal definition.vii This absence 
of a definition did not prevent the Working Group from acting efficiently and successfully. 
On the contrary, the Working Group has been praised for its openness and flexibility.viii The 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has also stated that the 
identification as members of a particular racial or ethnic group shall be based upon self-
identification, “if no justification exists to the contrary.”ix The UN Declaration on the Rights 
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of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) does not contain a definition of indigenous peoples either. 
Pursuant to Article 33, 1 UNDRIP, “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to determine their 
own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions.” 
 
To resolve questions of indigenousness in concrete settings, various authors have proposed a 
flexible approach. Erica Daes, the former Chairperson-Rapporteur of the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, has identified 
various “factors considered relevant to the concept of indigenous”, namely priority in time, 
the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, self-identification and recognition by 
other groups, and an experience of marginalisation.x She has stressed, however, that these 
factors “do not, and cannot, constitute an inclusive or comprehensive definition. Rather, they 
represent factors which may be present, to a greater or lesser degree, in different regions and 
in different national and local contexts.”xi Similarly, in his ‘constructivist approach’, 
Kingsbury suggests to combine different criteria in a nuanced and flexible way.xii As such, he 
identifies four uncontested and indispensable characteristics of the concept of indigenous 
peoples: (i) self-identification as an ethnic group; (ii) historical experience of, or contingent 
vulnerability to, severe disruption, dislocation, or exploitation; (iii) long connection with the 
region; and (iv) the wish to retain a distinct identity. Three further criteria, namely (i) non-
dominance in the state or region, (ii) close cultural affinity with a particular territory or land, 
and (iii) continuity based on historical priority, must be interpreted with some flexibility. 
Moreover, these latter criteria do not necessarily have to be present all three simultaneously, 
so as not to unjustly exclude certain groups from the qualification as indigenous peoples. 
Other additional indicators such as language and race are not essential, but may support the 
case in favour of qualification as an indigenous people. Sieder and Witchell have also pleaded 
for “flexible and dynamic conceptions” of indigenous peoples.xiii Finally, in response to the 
particular challenges relating to indigenousness on the African continent, the African 
Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities has advanced a 
“modern analytic understanding” of the term indigenous, with three fundamental 
characteristics: (i) self-definition, (ii) cultural difference, most prominently expressed in the 
distinctive relationship of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territory and natural resources, 
and (iii) an experience of marginalisation and dispossession.xiv The criterion of priority in 
time would, in the eyes of the Working Group, not allow an adequate analysis of the 
continuing structural inequalities within African independent states.xv 
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Such flexible conceptions of indigenous peoples, with self-identification as a central element, 
take into account the specific characteristics of indigenous peoples, while leaving enough 
space for regional and local particularities. This approach seems more appropriate than 
establishing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ definition at the international level, which would fit uneasily 
with various local contexts.  
 
In contrast with this rather open approach towards defining indigenous peoples, we know 
quite well who ‘children’ are – or at least we think we do. Article 1 of the quasi-universally 
ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) reads: “For the purposes of the present 
Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under 
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”.xvi Even though Article 1 explicitly 
confines its scope to the CRC, this definition has been widely adopted in national, regional 
and international legal frameworks and policies on children.xvii The consensus to apply 
children’s rights to persons below the age of eighteen years is thus very broad, especially 
when compared to the heated debates on the definition of indigenous peoples. Such a univocal 
definition of children obviously has its advantages, among which simplicity, clarity, a global 
common understanding of children, and the facilitation of cooperation between different 
jurisdictions. 
 
This wide endorsement of the CRC definition does not mean that there is no debate regarding 
the starting point of children’s rights, namely its application to the unborn child,xviii or the 
upper age limit of the definition of children. With respect to the latter, findings in 
neuroscience that the brain continues to develop until the age of 25 have generated calls to 
extend the scope of children’s rights up to that age.xix As discussed in the next subsection, a 
more flexible approach towards the boundary between ‘children’ and ‘youth’ may be 
warranted. Moreover, children are not a homogeneous group, but grow up in very diverse 
geographical, cultural and socio-economic contexts. Establishing a general cut-off age at 
eighteen years to define children appears to be quite a Eurocentric approach. In non-Western 
contexts, other factors besides chronological age also play a role in establishing the boundary 
between childhood and adulthood. Examples include the concept of maturity in Muslim legal 
tradition,xx ‘possessing understanding’ in Bangladesh,xxi and having productive and 
reproductive capacities in Southern and Eastern Africa.xxii Children in Africa are often more 
autonomous and independent at an earlier age than those growing up in a nuclear Western 
family, but they are also more accountable to their communities.xxiii Denying children certain 
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rights, such as a right to work in dignity,xxiv because of their formal status of children may 
then go against their best interests.  
Does the indigenous rights regime provide inspiration to address these challenges concerning 
the demarcation of the personal scope of children’s rights law? In line with the complex and 
flexible approaches towards defining indigenous peoples, this chapter suggests moving 
towards a multidimensional understanding of children, which does not exclusively focus on 
chronological age.xxv When thinking about children’s rights and to whom to apply them, 
importance should also be attached to other elements than the number of years one has been 
walking around on this globe. First, in line with the right of self-identification of indigenous 
peoples, more attention should be paid to how children perceive themselves. Not giving 
children a say in determining who can invoke children’s rights seems to be a continuation of 
the paternalistic and protectionist approach that predominated the early children’s rights 
movement, and goes against children’s right to express their views in matters affecting them 
and to have these views given due weight (Article 12 CRC). 
Second, other factors than chronological age may be relevant in determining the scope of 
children’s rights law, such as socio-psychological development, the role taken up in one’s 
family, community and society, as well as the cultural, socio-economic, historical and 
geographical context. The relevance of psychological development in the application of 
children’s rights law is already reflected in the concepts of ‘maturity’, as co-determining the 
impact of children’s expressed views (Article 12 CRC), and ‘evolving capacities’, as 
delineating the scope of the duty of parents and legal guardians to provide guidance to the 
child (Articles 5 and 14 CRC). The identification of the particular characteristics to be taken 
into account in defining the personal scope of children’s rights law in a certain context should 
then occur at the appropriate international, regional, national or local level.  
The proposal of a multidimensional approach towards defining children, i.e. going beyond 
chronological age to take into account self-identification as well as psychological and 
contextual factors, should not be understood as implying or suggesting lowering the standard 
of children’s rights law. On the contrary, a more flexible and contextualised approach towards 
defining children may lead to a more tailored and thus more adequate realisation of human 
and children’s rights. The experience of indigenous peoples has shown that a definitional 
approach combining various criteria in a flexible and nuanced way, may not be as problematic 
as one may think at first sight. For instance, one could think of a situation where a teenager 
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does not consider herself as a child anymore (self-identification), has the corresponding socio-
psychological capabilities, and is taking up adult duties within her family and community. In 
these circumstances, the rights of this teenager may be better protected by not considering her 
as a child, but by ensuring the realisation of her (general) human rights. 
 
b. Creating dichotomies… and building some bridges? 
 
During the last decades, categorical rights have been created within human rights law to 
rectify historical situations of substantive inequality, discrimination and marginalisation of 
certain groups (e.g. women, children, indigenous peoples, migrant workers and persons with 
disabilities).xxvi It was considered that the general human rights instruments did not 
adequately recognise and protect the specific needs and rights of these groups. Nevertheless, 
such categorical rights inevitably generate divisions between those who belong to a certain 
category and those who do not. Groups just over the edge, who cannot invoke the protection 
of a particular categorical rights regime, may then be among the first ones to fall through the 
cracks of the human rights system. 
 
As indigenous peoples are concerned, this may be particularly the case for local (peasant) 
communities.xxvii Historically as well as today, indigenous peoples have suffered from 
disdain, discrimination and human rights violations. Nowadays, however, a stronger 
international legal framework has turned indigenousness into a potentially ‘positive’ factor, as 
the indigenous identity comes with greater land and resource rights as well as more autonomy. 
Indigenous peoples may also more easily attract funding from international donors, as they 
are more ‘exotic’ and thus appealing than the ‘grey’ peasant communities next-door. So 
whereas before, ‘nobody wanted to be indigenous anymore’,xxviii today the pendulum seems to 
a certain extent have swung to the other side, and this to the detriment of the recognition of 
and respect for the rights of local non-indigenous communities. As a consequence, national 
minorities are increasingly redefining themselves as indigenous peoples, to gain access to this 
broader catalogue of rights to autonomy, land and legal pluralism.xxix 
 
The recognition of broader territorial, land and resource rights as well as greater participation 
rights of indigenous peoples may be particularly problematic for communities that share many 
characteristics that are usually associated with indigenous peoples – such as a close 
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connection with the land – but that do not qualify as ‘indigenous peoples’.xxx In Latin 
America, this is for instance the case for Afrodescendant maroon communities, whose 
ancestors escaped from slavery to establish their own communities: “These Afrodescendant 
groups developed separate racial/cultural collective identities distinct from those of the 
dominant mestizo majority, and forged a relationship to land or territory in the colonial period 
before the establishment of state sovereignty of the areas they occupied.”xxxi In recent years, 
the boundaries between the rights of indigenous peoples and these Afrodescendant maroon 
communities have become blurred. For instance, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has extended its jurisprudence on collective property rights of indigenous peoples to the 
Afrodescendant maroon communities in two cases against Suriname.xxxii  
 
Similarly, the establishment of children’s rights divides the human population in children on 
the one hand, and adults – such as parents and teachers – on the other. Children’s rights also 
separate children from ‘young adults’. Because of the cut-off age of eighteen, these young 
adults loose the protection of children’s rights law, even though the life of a nineteen-year-old 
may not be so different from that of a seventeen-year-old, and some nineteen-year-olds may 
find themselves in a more vulnerable situation than some seventeen-year-olds. Just as the 
Inter-American human rights jurisprudence has recognised the communal land rights of 
Afrodescendant maroon communities to the image of the land rights of indigenous peoples, it 
seems relevant to build more bridges between the rights of children and those of young adults. 
This is already being done in various situations. For example, the UN Guidelines for the 
Alternative Care of Children are not only applicable to children, but also, as appropriate, to 
“young persons already in alternative care and who need continuing care or support for a 
transitional period after reaching the age of majority under applicable law”.xxxiii This provision 
prevents a rupture in care during the – often complex – transition to adulthood. In Flanders, a 
child and youth impact report (JoKER) must be elaborated for draft decrees that have a direct 
impact on the interests of persons under the age of 25.xxxiv Both minors and young adults are 
thus included in its personal field of application, although another cut-off age (namely 25 
years) is established. 
 
It is concluded that within both indigenous peoples’ rights law and children’s rights law, steps 
are being taken to mitigate some of the potentially undesirable consequences of categorical 
rights systems, by extending part of their protection to those who just fall outside their 
personal scope. From a general human rights perspective, this evolution is to be applauded 
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and should continue where appropriate, so as to avoid that categorical protection creates new 
vulnerabilities. 
 
3. Western constructions 
 
A second domain characterised by some remarkable parallels, concerns the way in which 
children and indigenous peoples have been represented and constructed in Western society, 
not only in popular discourse but also in scholarship. A multiplicity of child images and 
constructions of indigenousness can be identified and situated on a continuum ranging from 
(overly) ‘negative’ to (overly) ‘positive’ appreciations. Different and even opposite images 
are often simultaneously present in a certain context, their strength depending on the 
particular intersection of time, place and actors involved. Within the confines of this chapter, 
it is not possible to do justice to the richness of analysis in historiographies on the 
constructions of childhood and indigenousness.xxxv Nevertheless, from an analytical 
perspective, some parallels between constructions of indigenous peoples and constructions of 
children may be identified, especially at both extremities of the continuum.  
 
Historically, particularly during colonial times, indigenous peoples were often considered 
‘primitive’ and ‘backward’, they needed to be civilised and proselytised. Such constructions 
underpinned the doctrines of terra nullius and guardianship.xxxvi Similarly, in Western society, 
children were long seen as the private property of their fathers, or as ‘not-yet’ human 
beings.xxxvii Both groups were marginalised in society: they were not considered fully, nor was 
their specificity acknowledged. 
 
Since then, an enormous shift in the perception of and approach towards indigenous peoples 
and children is noticeable, to the extent that today, both groups are often romanticised and 
idealised. Indigenous peoples have been represented as the guardians and stewards of Mother 
Earth, living in harmony with nature. The Romantic image of Indians as noble savages, 
expressed in the writings of Locke and Rousseau, was taken up again in the twentieth century 
to refer to the supposedly balanced relationship of indigenous peoples with their natural 
environment. The ‘ecologically noble savage’ was born; indigenous peoples were seen as 
‘natural conservationists’.xxxviii Likewise, the attitudes towards children changed 
tremendously. Zelizer, for instance, has argued that from the late nineteenth century onwards, 
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childhood underwent a process of ‘sacralisation’ in America: children were not only invested 
with emotional significance, they were also separated from their economic value – rendering 
them ‘priceless’.xxxix 
 
At the other far end of the continuum, less benign images of indigenous peoples and children 
can be discerned. Some Western conservationists, for instance, argue that nature conservation 
requires strict preservation, which is not reconcilable with human presence or resource use.xl 
They claim that sustainable resource use cannot sufficiently protect biodiversity, and point to 
instances of environmental destruction by indigenous peoples. This perception of fundamental 
incompatibility between humankind and nature is rooted in and still influenced by the 
American idea of wilderness preservation as it developed in the nineteenth century.xli 
Comparably, children that do not conform to the image of innocent angels tend to be set away 
as dangerous. A shift is being observed from welfare-oriented approaches for children ‘at 
risk’ towards perceiving children ‘as risk’, leading to the image of the ‘problem child’. The 
behaviour of children and young people is today increasingly problematised – and often 
criminalised –, especially in the public space.xlii 
 
Particularly interesting for the purposes of this chapter is that the image of both children and 
indigenous peoples has been used to characterise and essentialise the ‘other’ category. As 
such, “[o]ne of the most common observations in literature about colonial relations has been 
that indigenous populations are invariably cast as childlike in their nature”.xliii Such 
infantalisation of native populations was used by the colonisers to legitimate paternalistic 
policies and the exploitation of native economies.xliv Similarly, children have been constructed 
as either ‘primitives’ or ‘noble savages’. For instance, Gagen has argued that “US colonial 
policy did not simply construct the natives of the Philippines, Puerto Rico or Guam as 
primitive, but western child development theories themselves constructed the American child 
as inherently primitive”.xlv From such an evolutionary perspective, children were situated in a 
prehistorical phase of development and needed to evolve towards modernity, like America’s 
‘underdeveloped’ colonies. Jenks has referred to this image of the child as being primitive and 
wild as the Dionysian child.xlvi By contrast, when considering children as intrinsically good, 
they have been portrayed as ‘noble savages’; Jenks invoking here the mythological image of 
the Apollonian child.xlvii  
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Many of the constructions of indigenous peoples and children referred to above, are linked to 
the presumed ‘natural’ character of these groups, which may be assessed positively (‘noble 
savage’) or negatively (‘wild and primitive’). These images stand in opposition to the 
‘civilised’ Western world in general or adults in particular. The new sociology of childhood 
has tried to break through this binary construct of natural children versus civilised adults.xlviii 
Also in indigenous rights studies, the environmental harmony image has been 
deconstructed.xlix 
 
What are consequences of these constructions of indigenousness and childhood? In general, 
such constructions seem problematic, because they violate the competence of the group 
members and “their right to be valued on their own terms”.l Although ‘negative’ images have 
not disappeared, it seems that today idealised constructions of indigenous peoples and 
children predominate in Western society, often coupled with sentimentalism. Both groups 
arouse quite strong emotions with the ‘other’ (Western society or adults), who feels a need to 
‘preserve’ or ‘protect’ them respectively. Therefore, I discuss hereinafter two shared 
consequences of romanticised constructions of indigenous peoples and children, namely an 
adverse impact on rights protection and a lack of critical scientific analysis. 
 
First, if romantic images of indigenous peoples as guardians of Mother Earth and of children 
as inherently good turn out not to be supported by reality, this may have detrimental 
consequences for the recognition of and respect for the rights of these groups. For instance, 
the assumption of a harmonious relationship of indigenous peoples with nature has had the 
contradictory consequence that higher expectations have been attached to the attitudes and 
actions of these peoples toward the environment. The ecological footprint of an average 
conservationist residing in an industrial country is usually much larger than the one of an 
indigenous person.li Nevertheless, when practices of the latter are unfriendly to the 
environment, conservationists are very indignant. As Cronon has formulated it: “Why in the 
debates about pristine natural areas are “primitive” peoples idealized, even sentimentalized, 
until the moment they do something unprimitive, modern, and unnatural, and thereby fall 
from environmental grace?”lii These unrealistic standards regarding the conservationist 
behaviour of indigenous peoples have had a negative impact on the potential to realise 
indigenous peoples’ rights. In the words of Niezen: “[t]he high – or one may say impossible – 
expectations of environmental stewardship applied to indigenous peoples have a tendency to 
intrude upon their rights and thus their ability to prosper.”liii The rights of indigenous peoples 
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do not depend on their conservationist behaviour though. Likewise, children who do not 
behave as responsible citizens but become ‘a problem’, may be deprived of the specific 
protection of the children’s rights regime. For example, Belgian minors who are sixteen years 
or older when they commit a criminal office, can be referred to the criminal law system if the 
youth judge is of the opinion, on the basis of a societal and medical-psychological 
examination, that the minor is not ‘suitable’ for youth protection measures.liv The only 
criterion that can be taken into account is the subjective one of the personality of the minor. 
Similar systems in Europe exist in the Netherlands (also from the age of sixteen) and England 
and Wales (from the age of ten). However, in England and Wales, the judge can only decide 
to refer to the criminal law system on the basis of objective elements, such as the 
characteristics and seriousness of the criminal offence, or having an accomplice of age. In the 
Netherlands, a referral can be based on either subjective elements (related to the personality of 
the offender) or objective elements (related to the criminal offence).lv Notwithstanding the 
particularities of each system, they have in common that children who commit an offence may 
be referred from the juvenile justice system to the adult criminal law system. 
 
Second, idealised constructions may limit the possibility to adopt a critical perspective in 
research, a dynamic that seems to be at play in research on both indigenous peoples’ rights 
and children’s rights. For instance, according to Smith – a well-known anthropologist in Peru 
–, one of the reasons explaining the absence of much critical research on the process of 
political organisation in the Amazon region is the attitude prevailing in the small academic 
and NGO world accompanying the indigenous movement, “an attitude that combines 
romanticism with a feeling of guilt towards the indigenous, which hampers a critical and 
objective examination of indigenous political actions”.lvi By the same token, the image of 
children as being vulnerable, innocent and intrinsically good may contribute to an 
understanding of children’s rights as being ‘intrinsically good’ for children as well. Combined 
with the observation that much work remains to be done as regards the implementation of 
children’s rights, it is then often considered ‘not done’ to examine children’s rights from a 
critical perspective – be it with the aim of contributing to a more effective realisation of 
children’s rights.lvii 
 
By way of conclusion, is there then something to be ‘learnt’ in this domain of constructions 
and representations from (research on) indigenous peoples’ rights for (research on) children’s 
rights? In my opinion, both fields should increase efforts to unveil assumptions and 
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constructions that essentialise indigenous peoples and children, as well as the impact of these 
constructions on research, policy and practice. Such essentialising tendencies do not account 
for the multiple and complex layers of identity within every person and each group, and may 
have a negative impact on rights protection. 
 
4. Participation and consent 
 
Parallels between indigenous peoples’ rights and children’s rights may also be drawn in the 
domain of participation. In an effort to move away from assimilationist policies (toward 
indigenous peoples) and protectionist approaches (toward children), participation rights have 
taken on particular importance for both groups. Moreover, these rights have been 
conceptually developed in ways tailored to the specificities of indigenous peoples and 
children. Next to a general right to participation of indigenous peoples to at least the same 
extent as other sectors of the population,lviii this has implied the establishment of a specific 
right of indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consultation “whenever consideration 
is given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly” (Article 
6(1)(a) ILO Convention 169).lix Moreover, the right to free, prior and informed consent of 
indigenous peoples is being increasingly recognised, as elaborated below. Children on the 
other hand, have the right to express their views freely on all matters affecting them, and to 
these views being given due account in accordance with their age and maturity (Article 12 
CRC) – which has been in brief referred to as “the right to be heard”.lx 
 
In the area of participation, consultation and consent, I suggest that indigenous peoples’ rights 
law could inspire children’s rights law as regards two aspects: the further theoretical, legal 
and practical development of the collective dimension of the right of children to be heard, and 
the fleshing out of the attributes of the emerging right of children to consent (namely free, 
prior and informed). This section starts with a brief comparison between the two key 
provisions on participation in both fields of law, and closes with the identification of some 
common challenges in the realisation of the participation rights of indigenous peoples and 
children. 
 
Comparing Article 6 ILO Convention 169 and Article 12 CRC leads to the following 
observations. As the material scope is concerned, governments should consult indigenous 
peoples “on legislative or administrative measures”, whereas the right of children to be heard 
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broadly applies to “all matters”. The link between the matter and the right holder triggering 
the right is also formulated widely in the CRC (matters “affecting the child”). ILO 
Convention 169 requires a direct impact of the envisaged measure on indigenous peoples,lxi 
but explicitly accounts for the uncertain nature of such impact (measures “which may affect 
them directly”).lxii The possible influence on the eventual decision is similar: neither the right 
to consultation nor the right to be heard imply a veto power. Consultation of indigenous 
peoples should be carried out “with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the 
proposed measures”, but an absence of agreement does not invalidate the consultation.lxiii The 
views of children “are to be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child”, providing the decision-maker some leeway. Whereas the CRC does not offer further 
guidance on the modalities or quality criteria that should characterise the participation 
process, consultation of indigenous peoples should take place “through appropriate 
procedures and in particular through their representative institutions” (Article 6(1)(a) ILO 
Convention 169). Moreover, consultation must be undertaken “in good faith and in a form 
appropriate to the circumstances” (Article 6(2) ILO Convention 169). A final difference is 
that the right to consultation is a collective right of indigenous peoples (as evident from the 
‘representative institutions’ requirement), whereas the right of the child to be heard is both an 
individual and a collective right.  
 
In General Comment No. 12, the Committee on the Rights of the Child explicitly makes a 
distinction between “the right to be heard of an individual child and the right to be heard as 
applied to a group of children (e.g. a class of schoolchildren, the children in a neighbourhood, 
the children of a country, children with disabilities, or girls)”.lxiv It argues that this is a 
relevant distinction, because “the task of assessing a child’s age and maturity … is made more 
difficult when children express themselves collectively”.lxv The Committee continues to 
emphasise that “[e]ven when confronting difficulties in assessing age and maturity, States 
parties should consider children as a group to be heard, and the Committee strongly 
recommends that States parties exert all efforts to listen to or seek the views of those children 
speaking collectively”.lxvi The Committee then announces that  
 
[i]n section A (Legal analysis) of the general comment, the Committee deals with the 
right to be heard of the individual child. In section C (The implementation of the right 
to be heard in different settings and situations), the Committee considers the right to 
be heard of both the individual child and children as a group.lxvii 
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The Committee does not provide any explanation or justification for this different approach of 
the right to be heard of the individual child and of children as a group. The absence of a legal 
analysis of the right to be heard of children as a group seems a missed opportunity. Moreover, 
in the implementation section, the Committee does not clearly distinguish between the 
individual and group right to be heard. To further develop the collective dimension of 
children’s right to be heard, some lessons may be learnt from the experience built up 
regarding the consultation of indigenous peoples, for instance with regard to representativity. 
The functioning of indigenous organisations at the local, national, regional and international 
level has shown the challenges in ensuring that indigenous leaders at a higher level are still 
voicing the concerns of those they claim to represent. Maintaining open channels of 
communication and guaranteeing accountability are two ways in which these challenges can 
be mitigated.  
 
A related area of possible inspiration concerns the right to give consent. Indigenous peoples 
have the right to free, prior and informed consent in case of relocation (Article 16(2) ILO 
Convention 169; Article 10 UNDRIP) and the storage or disposal of hazardous materials in 
indigenous lands or territories (Article 29(2) UNDRIP).lxviii According to the Inter-American 
human rights jurisprudence, free, prior and informed consent is also required when “large-
scale development or investment projects … would have a major impact” on the territory of 
the people concerned.lxix The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
broadly stated that member states should ensure that “no decisions directly relating to the 
rights and interests [of indigenous peoples] are taken without their informed consent.”lxx 
Other UN human rights treaty bodies have also referred to the norm of free, prior and 
informed consent in relation to indigenous peoples, mostly in the context of resource 
extraction activities.lxxi Indigenous peoples themselves insist on the recognition of a wide 
right “to veto any developments proposed on our lands without our consent”.lxxii 
 
The CRC does not give children a right to consent. In General Comment No. 12, however, the 
right of a child to give consent is mentioned a few times. First, child offenders must give their 
“free and voluntary consent” in case of diversion, and “must be given the opportunity to 
obtain legal and other advice and assistance in determining the appropriateness and 
desirability of the diversion proposed”, the latter requirement thus ensuring an informed 
consent.lxxiii In health care, “[t]he Committee welcomes the introduction in some countries of 
a fixed age at which the right to consent transfers to the child, and encourages States parties to 
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give consideration to the introduction of such legislation.”lxxiv Moreover, the “informed 
consent” of children must be obtained concerning their participation in paediatric research and 
clinical trials.lxxv The elements of ‘free’ and ‘prior’ are not mentioned here. In line with the 
recognition of children as legal subjects and agentic actors, it seems relevant to rethink more 
broadly under which circumstances children should not only have a right to be heard, but a 
right to give consent as well. In the conceptualisation of this right to consent and its attributes, 
inspiration could be drawn from how the elements of ‘free’, ‘prior’ and ‘informed’ have been 
developed in the legal framework, jurisprudence and literature on indigenous peoples’ rights 
to consultation and consent.lxxvi More specifically, clear and accurate information must be 
provided in a language and format comprehensible for the target group (for instance, in 
indigenous peoples’ mother tongue and in child-friendly terms respectively). The information 
must be available sufficiently beforehand so that there is time to process and discuss the 
information internally, before engaging in the actual consultation process (‘informed’). This 
consultation must be held before the decision is taken (‘prior’) and without exercising unduly 
pressure (‘free’). 
 
Finally, indigenous peoples and children face some common challenges regarding 
participation. To start, unequal power relationships usually exist in the outward relationship: 
between indigenous peoples, an individual child or a group of children, on the one hand, and 
those that seek their opinion or listen to them, normally state representatives, on the other. 
When a group of indigenous peoples or children is consulted or being heard, power dynamics 
may also play internally. Subaltern or weaker voices risk receiving less attention. Persons that 
unite various markers of identity that are more prone to give rise to discrimination (such as 
gender, disability, ethnic origin, sexual orientation etc.), often experience more difficulties to 
have their voice heard. These challenges in relation to power dynamics are shared by other 
groups as well though. 
 
Other participatory challenges seem more particular for indigenous peoples and children. 
Because their ways of thinking and behaving tend to differ from those of Western society and 
adults respectively, indigenous peoples and children are usually perceived as difficult-to-reach 
target groups. As a consequence, participation is often reduced to a mere presence at 
meetings, without sufficient efforts being made to really listen and try to understand their 
views.lxxvii Moreover, indigenous peoples and children share the challenge of avoiding 
tokenism.lxxviii Both groups have been put on the stage of international events, for instance at 
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the United Nations, but – especially in earlier decades – unfortunately often more as an exotic 
‘bonus’ than as real stakeholders to be reckoned with. Summing up, for both indigenous 
peoples and children, the right to have their views being considered has developed in 
particular ways, as the ‘right to consultation’ and ‘the right to be heard’ respectively. When 
expanding the collective dimension of the right to be heard of children as a group, some of the 
lessons learnt in indigenous peoples’ rights law could be drawn upon. Also the more advanced 
conceptual development of the right to free, prior and informed consent in indigenous 
peoples’ rights law could inspire children’s rights law. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter reflected on whether and how indigenous peoples’ rights law could inspire 
children’s rights law. A careful infusion of the flexible and contextual approach used to define 
indigenous peoples was suggested, in this way going beyond the criterion of chronological 
age when thinking about the personal scope of children’s rights law. Moreover, children’s 
rights law could benefit from the conceptual advances within indigenous peoples’ rights law 
to strengthen the collective right of children to be heard as a group, and to develop the right to 
free, prior and informed consent of children. A domain in which both (research on) children’s 
rights law and indigenous peoples’ rights law should increase efforts, concerns addressing the 
adverse consequences of idealised constructions.  
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